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ADMINISTRATIVE DENATURALIZATION':
IS THERE "NOTHING YOU CAN DO
THAT CAN'T BE [UN]DONE"?2
Whether the attorney general can undo what she has
the power to do, naturalize citizens, depends on whether Congress
said she could.
I. INTRODUCTION
In August 1995, Doris Meissner, Commissioner of the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS), unveiled the most ambi-
tious naturalization campaign in the history of the United States.4
Called "Citizenship U.S.A.," the campaign was designed to enable
the INS to process over one million applications for naturalization in
the course ofjust one year.5 For many immigrants, this represented a
1. The term"administrative denaturalization" refers to a procedure created
by the INS for the purpose of stripping naturalized citizens of their citizenship
without having to sue them in a federal district court. See infra Part Ill.B.
2. THE BEATLES, All You Need is Love, on MAGICAL MYSTERY TOUR
(EMI/Capitol Records 1967). The author's slight alteration of the original
lyric was suggested by Judge Kleinfeld's opinion in Gorbach v. Reno, 219
F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2000) (Gorbach 11) (en bane), which pokes fun at the un-
derlying logic of the appellant Attorney General's argument
The heart of the Attorney General's argument is that the power to de-
naturalize is "inherent" in the power to naturalize. There is no reason
why that should be so. There is no general principle that what one can
do, one can undo. It sounds good, just as the Beatles' lyrics "Nothing
you can know that isn't known/ Nothing you can see that isn't shown!
Nowhere you can be that isn't where you're meant to be,"--sound
good. But as Sportin' Life said, "It ain't necessarily so."
Id. at 1095 (citations omitted).
3. Gorbach v. Reno, 179 F.3d 1111, 1127 (9th Cir. 1999) (Gorbach 1)
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
4. See U.S. to Speed Process of Becoming a Citizen, N.Y. TIM Es, Sept. 2,
1995, § 1, at 8.
5. See Memorandum on Naturalization, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1495 (Aug. 22, 1996). President Clinton expressed the goals of the Citizenship
U.S.A. program as follows:
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new hope of attaining their cherished dream of becoming naturalized
citizens.
United States citizenship has been described in such lofty terms
as "the highest hope of civilized men.",6 For many immigrants, it
represents the end of the long and winding road through the bureau-
cratic maze of the INS.v However, just when many new citizens
think they have finally been accepted into the general community
and are no longer at the mercy of the agency, they may find them-
selves haled back into administrative hearings to have their naturali-
zation revoked.
The awesome power to strip immigrants of their United States
citizenship has, until recently, been held exclusively by the courts.8
However, when Congress transferred the naturalization power from
federal and state courts to the Attorney General in 1990,9 it also
This Administration's target is to process and swear-in within 6
months of application all individuals eligible for citizenship. As we
meet this target, more than one million newcomers will become citi-
zens by the end of this year. After that, INS shall maintain those re-
forms necessary to stay current with the demand of new citizen appli-
cants.
Using all of the tools at your disposal, I ask you to ensure that policies
and practices necessary to accomplish these targets of one million new
citizens sworn-in and the elimination of the waiting list are imple-
mented.
Id.
6. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943).
7. In the words of Lennon and McCartney, this road "will never disap-
pear," THE BEATLES, The Long and Winding Road, on LET IT BE (EMI/Capitol
Records 1970), at least while one remains an alien living in the United States.
While it cannot be demonstrated conclusively that Lennon and McCartney
were writing about their immigration troubles in this song, they certainly had
firsthand experience with the bureaucracy of the INS. For an account of the
deportation proceedings brought against John Lennon by the INS, and the
novel legal strategy used to keep him in the United States, see Leon Wildes,
The Nonpriority Program of the Immigration and Naturalization Service Goes
Public: The Litigative Use of the Freedom of Information Act, 14 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 42, 42-49 (1976).
8. Before 1990, the Immigration and Nationality Act provided three routes
for revocation of naturalization, all of which involved court proceedings. See
infra Part III.A for a brief history of denaturalization proceedings before the
Immigration Act of 1990.
9. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 401, 104 Stat.
4978 (amending Immigration and Nationality Act § 310(a)).
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changed the wording of a provision that allowed courts to use their
already existing powers to reopen their own judgments to overturn
their own grants of naturalization.' 0 The Attorney General used this
provision to authorize the INS to create its own procedure for ad-
ministrative denaturalization."
While the promulgation of the new administrative denaturaliza-
tion regulations attracted little attention outside the immigration
bar,' 2 it became front-page news when hundreds of new citizens re-
ceived Notices of Intent to Revoke Naturalization.13 Many of these
immigrants had been naturalized as part of the Citizenship U.S.A.
program and had benefited from efficiencies made possible by the
transfer of the naturalization power from federal and state courts to
the Attorney General 4 This "denaturalization" campaign was the
dark flip-side of Citizenship U.S.A. The logic behind it was com-
pelling---if naturalization could be accomplished more speedily
through administrative proceedings than through court proceedings,
then surely it must make sense that denaturalization could also be ac-
complished more speedily through the INS. However, the campaign
raised serious doubts about the value of U.S. citizenship, and what it
really means to be a citizen, if citizenship can be taken away without
the procedural protections offered by the court system.'s
10. See id. § 407(d)(18)(D) (amending INA § 340(i)). Section 340(i) was
renumbered as Section 340(h) by the Immigration and Nationality Technical
Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 104(c)(1), 108 Stat. 4305.
11. See infra Part II.B for a history of the transfer of the naturalization
power and the purported transfer of the denaturalization power to the INS.
12. The new administrative denaturalization proceedings did, however, be-
come a great cause for concern among practitioners of immigration law, due to
the poor procedural protections offered in administrative denaturalization pro-
ceedings. See, e.g., Daniel Levy, Administrative Denaturalization: Practical
Issues Under New Standards, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1701 (1997).
13. See, e.g., Patrick J. McDonnell, Battling to Save Their Citienship, LA.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 1998, at Al.
14. The INS is able to process applications for naturalization more effi-
ciently than courts both because it is encumbered by fewer procedural con-
stramints and because it has the case histories of each potential applicant already
in its possession. See S. REP. No. 101-55, at 3 (1989) (explaining that con-
cerns of efficiency and speed motivated Congress to transfer the naturalization
power from the courts to the INS).
15. See United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 188 (1956) (insisting on a
"heavy criterion of proof... before decreeing denaturalization").
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This Note examines a recent decision of the en banc Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that the Attorney General
lacks statutory authority to institute denaturalization proceedings
conducted within the INS-proceedings for which there was never
an explicit grant of authority by Congress. 16 The purpose of this
Note is to place this case within the larger context of administrative
law decisions where the authority of executive branch officials to
interpret the laws they have been charged with implementing has
been limited when the rights of individuals are threatened. In par-
ticular, this Note will scrutinize the Gorbach decision for its effect
on the equal treatment of naturalized citizens and for the propriety of
its methods of statutory construction when important rights are
threatened. Finally, this Note will offer a brief sketch of a just and
workable system of naturalization and denaturalization and explain
why the system proposed by the INS is inconsistent with the princi-
ples of equal protection, procedural due process, and separation of
powers.
HI. DOES U.S. CrIIZENSHinp MATTER?
Before one can address the question of the procedures that can
and should be used for granting and revoking U.S. citizenship, the
threshold question must be answered: what is citizenship, and is it
an important right? There has been considerable difference of opin-
ion through the years on the value and importance of U.S. citizen-
ship, largely due to the Constitution's ambivalence on the subject.
17
Many prominent scholars and members of the judiciary, noting that
the Bill of Rights focuses its protections on "persons" rather than
"citizens,"' 18 have argued that the distinction between U.S.
16. See Gorbach v. Reno, 219 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2000) (Gorbach II).
17. See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
18. The Bill of Rights does not contain anywhere in its text the word "citi-
zen," but rather it makes guaranties of liberty to "the people" or "persons."
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I ("the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble") (emphasis added); U.S. CONST. amend II ("the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms") (emphasis added); U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV ("[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures") (emphasis added); U.S. CoNsT. amend. V
("[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury") (emphasis
["34:895
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citizens and noncitizens is of little practical importance.' 9  An
opposing school of thought, seizing upon constitutional20 and
added); U.S. CoNsT. amend. IX ("[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people') (emphasis added); U.S. CoNsT. amend. X ("[t]he powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people") (emphasis
added).
The only use of the word "citizen" in the pre-Civil War amendments
occurs in the Eleventh Amendment; however, it refers only to "[c]itizens of
another State" and "[c]itizens... of any Foreign State" and not to U.S. citizen-
ship. Perhaps most surprising to the modem reader, even the Twelfth
Amendment, describing the Byzantine mechanism for election of the President,
nowhere mentions the word "citizen."
19. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, Citizen or Person? What is Not Granted
Cannot Be Taken Away, in THE MORALITY OF CONSENT ch. 2, at 33 (1975)
("[r]emarkably enough-and as I will suggest, happily--the concept of citi-
zenship plays only the most minimal role in the American constitutional
scheme").
20. See, e.g., U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[n]o State shall make or en-
force any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States") (emphasis added); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (U.S. Rep-
resentatives must be "seven Years a Citizen of the United States") (emphasis
added); U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (U.S. Senators must be "nine Years a Citi-
zen of the United States") (emphasis added); U.S. CONST. art. fl, § 1, cI. 5 (the
President must be not only a citizen, but a "natural born Citizen" of the United
States); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (creating alienagejurisdiction in Federal
Court for cases involving U.S. citizens and "foreign... [c]itizens"); U.S.
CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged.., on account of race") (emphasis added);
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, cl. 1 ("[t]he right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged.., on account of sex") (emphasis added);
U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 ("[t]he right of citizens of the United States to
vote in any primary or other election.., shall not be denied or abridged.., by
reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax") (emphasis added); U.S.
CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 ("[t]he right of citizens of the United States, who
are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged...
on account of age) (emphasis added).
In addition to rights that the literal language of the Constitution limits to
citizens, the Supreme Court has interpreted certain rights granted to "the peo-
ple" so as not to protect, with their full force, the rights of aliens. See, e.g.,
Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491-92 (1999)
(stating in dicta by Justice Scalia that the government does not offend an illegal
alien's First Amendment right to freedom of association "by deporting him for
the additional reason that it believes him to be a member of an organization
that supports terrorist activity"); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
259, 269-71 (1990) (holding that a search and seizure by U.S. agents of a non-
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extraconstitutional 2' rights made explicitly dependent on U.S. citi-
zenship, has characterized citizenship as "nothing less than the right
to have rights. 22
In spite of the dubious intellectual lineage of the latter school of
thought,23 and whatever significance or lack thereof U.S. citizenship
may have held at the time of the framing of the Constitution, it is
clear that the distinction has acquired critical importance through
successive acts of Congress and Supreme Court rulings in the twenti-
eth century.24 Under modem immigration law, many rights are made
explicitly dependent on U.S. citizenship, despite the identification of
alienage as a "suspect class" for purposes of constitutional scrutiny
in many matters not relating to immigration law. 25 Arguably most
resident alien's property, located in another country, was not covered by the
Fourth Amendment because the alien was not one of "the people" protected
from unreasonable searches and seizures).
21. Particularly in the context of modem U.S. immigration law, there is a
tremendous gap between statutory and regulatory rights of U.S. citizens and
noncitizens. For example, U.S. citizens have the right to immigrate immediate
relatives, such as spouses and minor children, without being subject to the per-
country yearly immigration ceilings that apply when a U.S. permanent resident
wishes to do the same. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 201(b)(2)(A), 8
U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A) (1994). Citizens can also petition to immigrate broth-
ers and sisters, as well as married sons and daughters, which permanent resi-
dents cannot. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. §
1153(a) (1994). In addition to the immigration law benefits of citizenship, the
case has been made by commentators that one of the major reasons behind the
naturalization backlog that preceded the Citizenship U.S.A. program was Con-
gress's passage of bills that made certain welfare benefits explicitly dependent
on U.S. citizenship. See, e.g., David S. North, Two Perspectives on Naturali-
zation Policy, 20 IN DEF. OF ALIENS 229 (1998).
22. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting);
see also Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) (noting at length Justice
Harlan's views about preciousness of U.S. citizenship); cf Sugarman v. Dou-
gall, 413 U.S. 634, 651 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that "the
Constitution itself recognizes a basic difference between citizens and aliens.
That distinction is constitutionally important in no less than 11 instances in a
political document noted for its brevity").
23. Some scholars have traced the origins of the distinction between con-
stitutional "persons" and "citizens" back to the infamous Dred Scott decision
by Chief Justice Taney. See Bickel, supra note 19, at 36-42.
24. See infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (overturning
the U.S. Civil Service Commission's policy of excluding aliens from most civil
service positions, in spite of the federal power over immigration); Graham v.
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important among these is the right not to be deported. Though aliens
are entitled to certain due process rights in deportation proceedings,26
they have no substantive due process right to remain in this country.
United States citizens, on the other hand, cannot constitutionally be
deported This is so because, in the area of immigration law, a
sharp distinction has been drawn between citizens, who are entitled
to the full panoply of procedural and substantive due process rights,
and aliens, who are subject to the plenary power of Congress.2s Be-
cause deportation, a process to which only aliens are subject, can re-
sult in "loss of both property and life, or of all that makes life worth
living,' '29 any argument that citizenship is unimportant can only be
sustained on a theoretical level completely divorced from modem re-
alities.
Indeed, the argument that citizenship is unimportant can be eas-
ily refuted by the waves created by the Citizenship U.S.A. naturali-
zation program. If citizenship is not important, why was there such a
backlog in citizenship applications before the program began? And
why did over a million people, not even counting those that applied
and were denied, obtain citizenship through the program? And why
has the program created such a political firestorm in its wake?
Clearly, whatever significance the concept may have had when the
Constitution was framed, history and politics have invested U.S. citi-
zenship with considerable importance and made it a right that is emi-
nently worthy of protection.30
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (disallowing states from discriminating
on the basis of alienage in the distribution of welfare benefits because aliens
are a "discreet and insular" minority for whom "heightened judicial solicitude
is appropriate").
26. See, e.g., Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S.
86, 101 (1903).
27. See Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). This inconven-
ient fact has not, however, always stopped the INS from attempting to deport
U.S. citizens. See, e.g., Ian James, INS Sued Over U.S. Woman Agents Shack-
led, Called Liar and Deported, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2000, at A17.
28. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case),
130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889).
29. NgFungHo, 259 U.S. at284.
30. U.S. citizenship qualifies as a property interest as that term was defined
in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970), because it is available to
anyone who meets the statutory criteria-and is not barred by any of the prohi-
bitions--set forth in the Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 312-331, 8 U.S.C.
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III. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
In order to understand the significance of the transfer to the ex-
ecutive branch of the power to naturalize and, arguably, to denatu-
ralize, one must look to the statutory history of denaturalization un-
der the Immigration and Nationality Act and the caselaw that
interpreted it. Toward this end, a brief sketch of this history is of-
fered below.
A. The Statutory History of Naturalization and Denaturalization in
U.S. District Courts and State "Courts of Record"
Until 1990, the Immigration and Nationality Act gave United
States District Courts and "all courts of record in any State or Terri-
tory" the exclusive power to naturalize citizens.3 ' Due to concerns
about fraudulently obtained citizenship,32 the Act also included a
provision under which U.S. Attorneys could institute proceedings in
any of the above-mentioned courts to revoke citizenship "upon affi-
davit showing good cause therefor ... on the ground that [citizenship
was] illegally procured or [was] procured by concealment of a mate-
rial fact or by willful misrepresentation . . . ."33 This provision,
which has generated substantial litigation that has attempted to
§§ 1423-1442 (1994). Though "the burden is on the alien applicant to show
his eligibility for citizenship in every respect," Berenyi v. Dist. Dir., 385 U.S.
630 (1967), the statutory provisions governing naturalization do not afford the
Attorney General the discretion to deny an application if this burden is met.
Indeed, a certificate of citizenship has been analogized to a public land grant-
the quintessential example of a property interest conferred on individuals by
the government. See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943)
(citing Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 238 (1912)). U.S. citizen-
ship can also be thought of as a type of"meta-property interest," because other
statutory entitlements, see infra note 21, and constitutional rights, see infra
notes 20, 25-28, 52, are dependent on it.
31. Immigration and Nationality Act § 3 10(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1421(a) (1988)
(amended 1990).
32. One of the most important uses of the formal statutory procedure al-
lowing denaturalization was the problem presented by former Nazis who had
entered the United States following World War II. By misrepresenting their
past, some war criminals had eventually gone on to obtain citizenship. Though
the INA made such individuals deportable, see Immigration and Nationality
Act § 237(a)(4)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(D) (1994), the government was
faced with the reality that U.S. citizens are not subject to deportation. Hence,
such individuals must first be denaturalized before they can be deported.
33. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 340(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1994).
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define the types of "misrepresentation" and "concealment" that rise
to the level of justifying denaturalization, 34 remains, with minor
amendments, in force to the present day. 5
The procedure authorized by section 340(a) is substantially
similar to older statutory procedures for denaturalization on account
of fraud or misrepresentation outside the record.36 However, when
Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1952, 37 it
added an alternative avenue for revocation of naturalization using a
different underlying procedural mechanism-allowing the court that
originally granted naturalization to reopen and revoke its original
grant on the motion of the INS, rather than requiring the institution
of a new action to revoke naturalization.38 This provision was added
by Congress most likely in reaction to a 1951 Supreme Court deci-
sion, Bindczyck v. Finucane.39 The Bindczyck Court held that the ex-
clusive procedure for denaturalization based on evidence of fraud
34. See, e.g., Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988); Chaunt v.
United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960).
35. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 340(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).
36. The predecessor of section 340 was section 338 of the Nationality Act,
the statutory scheme that governed naturalization before the enactment of the
Immigration and Nationality Act. See Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-
853, § 338, 54 Stat. 1137.
37. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
38. See id. § 3400) (redesignated as § 340(i) by Immigration Technical
Corrections Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-525, § 9(dd)(3), 102 Stat. 2609,
2621, amended to substitute administrative authority for judicial authority by
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 407(d)(18)(D), 104 Stat.
4978, 5046, and redesignated as § 340(h) by Immigration and Nationality
Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 104(c)(1), 108 Stat.
4305, 4308. Immediately prior to the enactment of the current version at issue
in the Gorbach litigation, the subsection read.
POWER OF COURT TO CORRECT, REOPEN, ALTER, MODIFY OR VACATE
JUDGMENT OR DECREE
Nothing contained in this section shall be regarded as limiting, deny-
ing or restricting the power of any naturalization court, by or in which
a person has been naturalized, to correct, reopen, alter, modify, or va-
cate its judgment or decree naturalizing such person, during the term
of such court or within the time prescribed by the rules of procedure or
statutes governing the jurisdiction of the court to take such action.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 340(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1451(i) (1988) (amended
1990).
39. 342 U.S. 76 (1951).
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outside the record was to institute new proceedings in a district
court.40 By so holding, the Court prohibited a practice that had de-
veloped of state and federal courts reopening and vacating their own
naturalization orders.4'
B. The Transfer of the Naturalization Power to the
Attorney General and the Birth ofAdministrative Denaturalization
The entire landscape of naturalization law was changed by the
passage of the Immigration Act of 1990,42 which transferred the
power to naturalize from state and federal courts to the Attorney
General. 3 With the power to naturalize no longer vested in the court
system, the old provision regarding the power of a court to reopen
and revoke its orders of naturalization was rendered meaningless.
Thus, a conforming amendment was passed44 that changed the lan-
guage of the provision to read:
Power to correct, reopen, alter, modify, or vacate order
Nothing contained in this section shall be regarded as lim-
iting, denying, or restricting the power of the Attorney
General to correct, reopen, alter, modify, or vacate an order
naturalizing the person.
45
Interpreting this section as a grant of power to create denaturali-
zation proceedings conducted by the INS, the Attorney General dele-
gated her authority to the INS, which promulgated Regulation 340.1,
the regulation at issue in Gorbach v. Reno.46
The new regulations created immediate concern among
practitioners of immigration law because, unlike the judicial
40. See id.
41. See id. at 85-86. The statutory revocation proceedings in force at the
time of Bindczyck--under § 338 of the Nationality Act of 1940-were the
predecessor of the modem proceedings under INA § 340(a). See supra note
36.
42. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
43. See id. § 401 (amending Immigration and Nationality Act § 310(a), 8
U.S.C. § 1421(a), to read: "[t]he sole authority to naturalize persons as citizens
of the United States is conferred upon the Attorney General").
44. See id. § 407(d)(18)(D).
45. Immigration and Nationality Act § 340(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (h) (1994).
46. See Revocation of Naturalization, 61 Fed. Reg. 55,550 (Oct. 28, 1996)
(codified at 8 C.F.R. § 340.1).
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denaturalization procedures which were previously the exclusive
route for revocation of citizenship, these new procedures allowed the
INS to rescind citizenship in a comparatively summary fashion.47
One of the most alarming features of the new regulations was the
shift in the burden of proof Whereas Supreme Court caselaw had
previously put a heavy burden on the government to prove fraud in
obtaining naturalization, 48 the new regulations put the burden of
proof squarely on the naturalized citizen. 9
In addition to the obvious due process concerns raised by the
regulations, it is interesting to note that the individual haled into
these administrative proceedings is referred to repeatedly as an "ap-
plicant" for naturalization, rather than as a "citizen" 50-- even though
naturalization has already been granted. The INS thus constructively
places the individual into the position of an alien and not a U.S. citi-
zen, thereby placing the individual within the plenary power of
47. See, e.g., Levy, supra note 12, at 1701.
48. See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943) ("To set
aside... a grant [of citizenship] the evidence must be clear, unequivocal, and
convincing-it cannot be done upon a bare preponderance of evidence which
leaves the issue in doubt' (internal quotations omitted)).
49. See 8 C.F.R. § 340.1(b)(6) (2000) (stating that "the applicant bears the
burden of persuading the district director that, notwithstanding the evidence
described in the notice, the applicant was eligible for naturalization at the time
of the order purporting to admit the applicant to citizenship"). The INS has
since changed this burden of proof An interim rule published in the Federal
Register on March 31, 2000-little more than a week after oral arguments
were heard for the en bane decision in Gorbach--moved the burden to the INS
to prove by "clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence that the grounds for
reopening and revoking [citizenship] ... have been met." Revoking Grants of
Naturalization, 65 Fed. Reg. 17,127, 17,128 (Mar. 31, 2000) (amending 8
C.F.R. § 340.1(b)(6)). This amendment brings the evidentiary burden in line
with the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard set forth in Schneider-
man, 320 U.S. at 125.
50. For further discussion on the possible significance of this distinction,
see discussion infra Part V.A.1. At the very least, this may explain why the
INS put the burden of proof on the citizen, rather than on the government, in
the regulations as originally promulgated. Compare Berenyi v. Dist. Dir., 385
U.S. 630, 637 (1967) (stating that vhen seeking citizenship, "the burden is on
the alien applicant to show his eligibility... in every respect," and all doubts
"should be resolved in favor of [the government]"), with Schneiderman, 320
U.S. at 125 (stating that in judicial denaturalization proceedings, the burden is
on the government to prove fraud by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing7" evi-
dence once citizenship has been granted).
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Congress to control decisions relating to immigration. 5' If the indi-
vidual is merely an "applicant," it is clear that no rights have vested
as a result of the initial grant of citizenship, and therefore the due
process rights possessed by the individual are the same as those of an
alien. This linguistic trick accomplishes a great deal in the way of
escaping the demands of due process and equal protection, since the
Supreme Court has historically upheld immigration laws that would
not pass constitutional muster if applied to U.S. citizens.
52
This conceptual shift--treating a naturalized citizen as a mere
"applicant" for citizenship-is a dangerous legal fiction that erodes
the value of citizenship for all Americans and creates a type of de
facto second-class citizenship for naturalized aliens. The statutory
authority of the Attorney General to promulgate the regulations at is-
sue in Gorbach v. Reno rests on such a fiction, because while aliens
applying for citizenship are clearly subject to the Attorney General's
power to administer the federal immigration and naturalization
laws, 53 it is almost equally clear that U.S. citizens are not.54 A nar-
row reading of the statutes governing the Attorney General's author-
ity is appropriate in these circumstances, as Supreme Court precedent
51. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
52. Particularly in the context of the rights of aliens to enter the United
States, the Supreme Court has given deference to the political branches of the
government that borders on claiming a lack of jurisdiction to entertain ques-
tions of the aliens' rights. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953); United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy,
338 U.S. 537, 542-44 (1950) ("When Congress prescribes a procedure con-
cerning the admissibility of aliens, it is not dealing alone with a legislative
power. It is implementing an inherent executive power.... Whatever the pro-
cedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied
entry is concerned."). The procedures at issue in both Knauff and Mezei al-
lowed the Attorney General to detain an alien indefinitely on the basis of con-
fidential information that was not released to the alien. Though the Court has
insisted on higher standards of due process in other contexts, such as the de-
portation of aliens already admitted to the United States, it has never granted
aliens the full panoply of due process rights accorded to U.S. citizens. See su-
pra Part II.
53. See infra Part V.A.1 for discussion of the Attorney General's unique
powers over aliens in the United States.
54. "The Attorney General shall be charged with the administration and en-
forcement of [the Immigration and Nationality Act] and all other laws relating
to the immigration and naturalization of aliens." Immigration and Nationality
Act § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
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has consistently demanded a narrow reading of statutes when a broad
reading would threaten the process due a U.S. citizen in a denaturali-
zation action.5 5 Such a narrow construction is typical not only in de-
naturalization cases, but also in other cases where a broad reading
either implicates a basic right,56 or otherwise seems to give an
agency overly broad power.5 7  Regulation 340.1, were it upheld,
would allow the INS to extricate itself from the political debacle of
Citizenship U.S.A. at the expense of freshly sworn-in citizens. Thus,
the Ninth Circuit, by striking it down, has upheld the rights of these
citizens as equal members of the American community.
IV. CASE BACKGROUND
A. Facts
From August 1995 to September 1996, the Clinton administra-
tion's Citizenship U.S.A. program resulted in an unprecedented
1,049,867 new U.S. citizens. 58 However, in its rush to offer citizen-
ship to those qualified to receive it, the INS was estimated to have
naturalized over 6000 persons who may not have been qualified, in-
cluding many who allegedly failed to disclose criminal back-
grounds.59 This created enormous political pressure on the INS to
rescind the citizenship of those who were improperly naturalized.60
One of the most striking aspects of this denaturalization cam-
paign was the type of people targeted. In the past, perhaps because
the procedures for denaturalization were more cumbersome, the INS
55. See, e.g., United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 187 (1956) (finding
due process concerns to be "relevant to construction" of subpoena power con-
ferred by ambiguously worded statute where proceedings were "calculated to
bring about the denaturalization of citizens").
56. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-30 (1958) (involving use of
narrow construction of statute where liberal construction would give Secretary
of State overly broad discretion to limit the fundamental right to travel).
57. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (The
Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
58. See Miguel Perez, WNo's to Blame for Crisis Over Immigration?,
RECORD, Apr. 10, 1998, at Lll.
59. See McDonnell, supra note 13. Many of the facts that follow are taken
from McDonnell's article for the purpose of adding color and a human dimen-
sion to the fairly narrow and technical legal question at issue in Gorbach.
60. See infra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
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had focused its efforts on only the most egregious cases of fraudu-
lently obtained citizenship. The most celebrated cases involved Nazi
war criminals who lied about their past in an effort to become U.S.
citizens. 61 In stark contrast to these headline-grabbing cases, many
of the individuals targeted for administrative denaturalization were
ordinary, law-abiding persons who were accused of misrepresenta-
tions on their applications for naturalization that would probably
strike most people as minor.62
Irina Gorbach, the first named plaintiff in Gorbach v. Reno, was
hardly the type of person one might have expected to be targeted for
so extreme a process as denaturalization. A software engineer at Mi-
crosoft, Gorbach was accused of lying on her naturalization applica-
tion about her place of residence, though she claimed to have in-
formed the INS that she moved while her application was still
pending.63
Another new citizen, Agueda Escalante, was targeted for de-
naturalization on the grounds that she had willfully concealed a past
arrest on her application for naturalization.64 The allegation
stemmed from a surreal run-in with the police, who appeared at her
house ostensibly in response to a 911 call. 65 After confirming that
there was no emergency, the officers looked around Escalante's
home and discovered a common houseplant that they mistook for
66Bmarijuana. Though Escalante was never formally charged with any
crime, she was handcuffed and taken to the police station, and her
plant was seized.67 Because no charges were filed once the police
discovered their mistake, Escalante did not consider herself to have
been "arrested," and consequently did not report the incident on her
application for naturalization. 68 On the basis of this incident, the INS
61. See, e.g., GREAT AMERICAN TRALs 709-11 (Edward W. Knappman
ed., 1994) (describing the celebrated denaturalization trial of John Demjanjuk,
a naturalized U.S. citizen who was identified by Holocaust survivors as "Ivan
the Terrible," a notorious Nazi prison official).
62. See generally McDonnell, supra note 13 (describing three such minor
misrepresentations).
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
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told Escalante, in her Notice of Intent to Revoke Naturalization
(hereinafter "NOJR"),69 that "[y]ou were not a person of good moral
character when you took the oath of allegiance," and that the INS
would therefore seek to revoke her citizenship.70
Gorbach, Escalante, and eight other named plaintiffs who were
served with NOIRs filed a class action lawsuit against the INS,
seeking to enjoin the agency from conducting denaturalization pro-
ceedings under regulations they believed were promulgated without a
proper grant of authority from Congress.
7'
B. District Court Proceedings
On July 9, 1998, Judge Barbara Rothstein of the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Washington granted the plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the INS from con-
ducting administrative denaturalization pending resolution of the le-
gality of the regulations and denied the Attorney General's motion to
dismiss. 72 After ruling that the plaintiffs had standing to sue73 and
that their claims were ripe,74 Judge Rothstein found that the plaintiffs
had raised questions about the Attorney General's authority to prom-
ulgate the regulations that were sufficiently serious to justify the re-
quested preliminary injunction.75
69. This Note adopts the abbreviation used in the three-judge panel opinion,
which does not indicate vhy it refers to the notice as a "NOIR" rather than the
more obvious acronym"NIRN." See Gorbach v. Reno, 179 F.3d 1111, 1116
(9th Cir. 1999) (Gorbach 1). Admittedly, the former has a more poetic quality
than the latter and has the added advantage of suggesting the dark tone of the
proceedings into which it hales the new citizen.
70. McDonnell, supra note 13. In addition to the indignity she suffered at
the hands of the INS, McDonnell reports that Escalante "never did get her
plant back." Id.
71. See Gorbachv. Reno, 219 F.3d 1087, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2000) (Gorbach
i) .
72. See Gorbach v. Reno, 181 F.RD. 642, 645 (V.D. Wash. 1998).
73. See id. at 647-48.
74. See id. at 648.
75. See id. at 648-50. Because Judge Rothstein found that the plaintiffs had
raised a sufficiently serious question about the Attorney General's authority to
promulgate the regulations, she did not address their two alternative argu-
ments: that the regulations violated due process and the Administrative Proce-
dure Act See id. at 648.
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On August 7, 1998, Judge Rothstein adopted a magistrate
judge's recommendation for class certification, thereby allowing
certain plaintiffs to serve as class representatives whose claims
would otherwise be moot because the INS had dropped the proceed-
ings against them.
76
C. Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals - The Divided Three-Judge Panel
Judge Pamela A. Rymer, writing for a divided three-judge panel
of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 7 held that the Attorney
General possessed statutory authority to promulgate Regulation
340.1 and therefore vacated the district court's preliminary injunc-
tion as moot.
78
The majority opinion identified five guiding principles used in
formulating its decision, though it stated that the decision regarding
the Attorney General's authority to denaturalize "ultimately turn[s]
on the statutory scheme itself. . . ,,79 First, according to the court,
when a statute gives an agency the power to promulgate "'such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out [its provisions]'...
a regulation promulgated thereunder will be sustained so long as it is
'reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation.' 80
Second, because a "precious right" is at risk in denaturalization pro-
ceedings, the court stated that "summary revocation procedures are
disfavored."'', Third, because administrative agencies do not tend to
guard individual rights as jealously as Article Ill courts, the court
76. See id. at 644-45 (adopting magistrate judge's recommendation for
class certification in Gorbach v. Reno, No. C98-278R, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11850 (W.D. Wash. July 17, 1998)).
77. Judge Arthur Alarcon joined the opinion of the court, and Judge An-
drew Kleinfeld filed a dissenting opinion. See Gorbach v. Reno, 179 F.3d
1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999) (Gorbach 1).
78. See id. at 1113-14.
79. Id. at 1120.
80. Id. (citing Balelo v. Baldridge, 724 F.2d 753, 760 (9th Cir. 1984) (en
banc) (quoting Mourning v. Family Publ'ns Serv. Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369
(1973))).
81. Id. (citing Magnuson v. Baker, 911 F.2d 330, 335 n.11 (9th Cir. 1990)).
The court elaborated that "we expect notice and opportunity to be heard before
naturalization can be revoked, and exceptional grounds such as fraud or mis-
representation to exist before the authority to revoke a citizenship judgment is
exercised." Id.
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assumed that "there should be judicial adjudication of the issue of
citizenship and a heavy criterion of proof by the government before
decreeing denaturalization 'unless by appropriate explicitness the
lawmakers make them inapplicable.' 82 Fourth, the court asserted
that "[e]very tribunal, judicial or administrative, has some power to
correct its own errors or otherwise appropriately to modify its judg-
ment, decree, or error., 83 Fifth, and finally, the court presumed that
Congress intends its statutory amendments to have "real and sub-
stantial effect., 8 4 The opinion does not note how each of these five
factors are to be balanced relative to one another, and it seems to rely
most heavily on the fourth and fifth factors, while paying only lip
service to the second and third.
The majority conceded that section 340 "nowhere says, in so
many words, that the Attorney General shall have the authority to re-
open" orders of naturalization. 85 Nevertheless, the court decided that
the lack of explicit congressional authorization did not undermine
her8 6 authority to create administrative denaturalization procedures*
8 7
On October 19, 1999, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals voted
to rehear the case en bane, thereby withdrawing the original three-
judge panel opinion.
88
D. The Ninth Circuit's En Banc Decision
On July 20, 2000, the en bane Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit 89 unanimously reversed the decision of the three-judge panel
82. Id. (citing United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 188 (1956) (quoting
Ng FungHo v. White, 259 U.S. 276,285 (1922))).
83. Id. at 1120-21 (citing Alberta Gas Chems., Ltd. v. Celanese Corp., 650
F.2d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting 2 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 18.09, at 606 (1958))).
84. Id. at 1121 (citing Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995)).
85. Id. at 1119 (emphasis in original).
86. In order to minimize the use of the awkward term "hisfher," this Note
adopts the convention of referring to all executive branch officers by the gen-
der of the officeholder at the time when the Gorbach litigation arose.
87. See id. at 1121.
88. Gorbach v. Reno, 192 F.3d 1329 (9th Cir. 1999) (granting rehearing en
bane without published opinion).
89. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit hears "en bane" cases in
panels of eleven judges, selected more or less at random from among the over
forty judges that make up the appellate courL See FED. R APP. P. 35; 9TH CIR.
R. 35-3, available at httpJ/vww.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/documents.
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and upheld the district court's injunction.90 In an opinion by Judge
Andrew J. Kleinfeld, the author of the dissenting opinion on the
original three-judge panel,91 the court held that the power to denatu-
ralize U.S. citizens could not be implied from the powers that Con-
gress had explicitly granted to the Attorney General in the area of
naturalization.92 After deciding that the case was ripe for review93
and that the trial court had not abused its discretion in granting the
preliminary injunction, 94 the court proceeded to address the merits of
the case.
The Attorney General purported to find her power to denatural-
ize in a statutory subsection that the court called the "saving
clause," 95 which states that "[n]othing contained in this section shall
be regarded as limiting, denying, or restricting the power of the At-
torney General to correct, reopen, alter, modify, or vacate an order
naturalizing the person. ' '96 The Attorney General argued that, under
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,97 her interpretation
of the saving clause as a grant of authority to denaturalize was "enti-
tled to considerable deference." 98 The court decided that the Attor-
ney General's Chevron analysis was flawed because Chevron only
counsels deference to agency interpretations of law when a statute,
read in context, does not clearly answer the legal question being
nsf/Local+Rules?OpenView. The panel that heard Gorbach 11 consisted of
Judge Andrew J. Kleinfeld, who wrote the lead opinion, Chief Judge Procter
Hug, Jr., and Circuit Judges James R. Browning, Mary M. Schroeder, Diar-
muid F. O'Scannlain, Thomas G. Nelson, Michael Daly Hawkins, A. Wallace
Tashima, Sidney R. Thomas, Susan P. Graber, and Kim McLane Wardlaw.
See Gorbach v. Reno, 219 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2000) (Gorbach II) (en
banc).
90. See Gorbach 11, 219 F.3d at 1087-88.
91. See Gorbach v. Reno, 179 F.3d 1111, 1127 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kleinfeld,
J., dissenting). The majority opinion in Gorbach I is an expanded version of
Judge Kleinfeld's dissenting opinion in Gorbach 1, with additional citations to
authority, several new arguments, and stirring language about the value of U.S.
citizenship thrown in for good measure.
92. See Gorbach 11, 219 F.3d at 1089.
93. See id. at 1091-92.
94. See id. at 1092.
95. Id. at 1094.
96. Id. (citing Immigration and Nationality Act § 340(h), 8 U.S.C. §
1451(h) (1994)).
97. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
98. Gorbach II, 219 F.3d at 1093.
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interpreted.9 9 The court, reading the particular statutory subsection
at issue within the context of its history and its place within the
larger statutory scheme of naturalization and denaturalization, de-
cided that Congress was unambiguous in not conferring on the At-
torney General the power to denaturalize.100 Because "[a]n agency
may not confer power upon itself,"''1 Congress's failure to confer
this power would leave the Attorney General without authority to
promulgate the regulations at issue in the Gorbach litigation.
The court acknowledged that Congress had explicitly granted
the Attorney General the power to naturalize citizens. 02 However, it
noted that she had been given only very circumscribed powers to
undo her actions in this area. For example, the court noted that the
Attorney General has the power to cancel certificates of naturaliza-
tion, but that such cancellations do not affect the underlying citizen-
ship of an individual whose certificate has been cancelled.10 3 The
court also observed that, in addition to withholding power from the
Attorney General to effect denaturalization through cancellation of
certificates, Congress also created an elaborate statutory procedure
for stripping an individual of his or her citizenship through an action
brought in district court by a U.S. Attorney. 0 4 By looking at the
saving clause in the context of other provisions of the Immigration
and Nationality Act dealing with denaturalization and related issues,
the court concluded that the negatively worded saving clause could
not be construed as a positive grant of authority to denaturalize.10 5
The court went on to point out that it is not even clear that the
Attorney General ever issues an "order" of naturalization that
is separate from the certificate of naturalization itself, as the
99. See id. (citing Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984)).
100. See id.
101. Id. at 1092-93 (quoting Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comnm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S.
355 (1986)).
102. See id. at 1093.
103. See id. at 1093-94. Ironically, proceedings to revoke certificates of citi-
zenship, where the underlying status is not at stake, are subject to greater pro-
cedural protections than those set forth in Regulation 340.1, where citizenship
is at stake. See Levy, supra note 12, at 1708-09.
104. See Gorbach11, 219 F.3dat 1093-94.
105. See id. at 1094.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW
naturalization courts had previously done. 10 6 If she does not, then
the saving clause, which only specifically allows the Attorney Gen-
eral to "reopen ... or vacate an order,"'07 has, as Judge Kleinfeld
points out, "nothing to save."' 108
Because the statute, literally read, does not preserve any power
that the Attorney General actually possessed to begin with, Judge
Kleinfeld observed that the heart of her argument "is that the power
to denaturalize is 'inherent' in the power to naturalize."'1 9 Judge
Kleinfeld pondered the merits of this argument with a healthy dose
of wit:
There is no reason why that should be so. There is no gen-
eral principle that what one can do, one can undo. It sounds
good, just as the Beatles' lyrics "Nothing you can know that
isn't known/ Nothing you can see that isn't shown/ No-
where you can be that isn't where you're meant to be,"--
sound good. But as Sportin' Life said, "It ain't necessarily
Having dismissed the strains of hippie jurisprudence underlying
the Attorney General's central argument, Judge Kleinfeld then gave
examples of situations where what one can do, one cannot legally
undo:
A person can give a gift, but cannot take it back. A minis-
ter, priest, or rabbi can marry people, but cannot grant di-
vorces or annulments for civil purposes. A jury can acquit,
but cannot revoke its acquittal and convict. Whether the
Attorney General can undo what she has the power to do,
naturalize citizens, depends on whether Congress said she
could. "'
106. See id.
107. Immigration and Nationality Act § 340(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1451(h) (1994)
(emphasis added).
108. Gorbach 1I, 219 F.3d at 1095.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing THE BEATLES, All You Need is Love, on MAGICAL MYSTERY
TouR (EMI/Capitol Records 1967); GEORGE GERSHNVIN & IRA GERSHWIN,
PORGY AND BESS (1934)).
111. Id. Another good illustration of the principle invoked by Judge Klein-
feld can be found in the recent controversy involving refugees from Haiti
seeking asylum in the United States. In 1981, the Reagan administration
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The opinion goes on to point out that a valid inference might be
made that Congress had intended the power to naturalize to include
the power to denaturalize, if practicality required that both powers be
exercised by the same governmental entity.'1 2 However, as Judge
Kleinfeld explained, this is not the case. Because the INS can proc-
ess a vastly greater volume of cases than the courts, Judge Kleinfeld
observed that it makes sense to give the agency the responsibility of
handling the vast numbers of naturalization applications that are filed
each year."3 Denaturalization, on the other hand, is a process best
handled by the court system, with its emphasis on case-by-case adju-
dication and protection of individual rights. As Judge Kleinfeld ob-
served, "administrative agencies.., are dubious instruments for per-
forming relatively rare acts catastrophic to the interests of the
individuals on whom they are performed."1 4 Because of the relative
strengths of administrative and judicial action, Judge Kleinfeld ob-
served that it is reasonable to assume that Congress "would delegate
the power to naturalize to an administrative agency, and lodge the
power to denaturalize in district courts, based on the number of cases
and the relative risks to individual liberty in the two kinds of cases
,,115
The opinion next explains how the court's reading of the
statute harmonizes the Gorbach case with precedent Supreme Court
adopted a policy--continued by the Bush and Clinton administrations-of in-
terdicting Haitian refugees at sea before they could reach U.S. shores. See
generally THOMAS ALEXANDER. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP, PROCESS AND POLICY 1158-61 (4th ed. 1998) (giving history of
the policy and criticisms leveled against it). The refugees interdicted at sea did
not have a right to have their asylum claims heard. See id. However, any
refugees who arrived on U.S. soil acquired a vested right to have their asylum
claim heard before they could legally be deported. See id. at 1028 n.22 (de-
scribing the procedure of expedited removal of undocumented aliens and the
use of asylum claims as a defense to removal). The act of reaching U.S. soil
therefore gave these individuals a right that could not be summarily revoked,
even though the government could validly have avoided the right from vesting
in the first place.
112. See Gorbach H, 219 F.3d at 1095.
113. See id. at 1095-96. The legislative history of section 340(h) reveals that
fast, efficient processing of naturalization applications was a motivating factor
in Congress's decision to make naturalization an administrative matter. See S.
Rep. No. 55, at 3 (1989).
114. Gorbach 1I, 219 F.3d at 1095.
115. Id. at 1096.
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decisions that gave narrow construction to statutes touching on de-
naturalization. For example, in Bindczyck v. Finucane,"16 the Su-
preme Court rejected the notion that naturalization is akin to an ordi-
nary judgment which courts can undo in the same manner in which
they might vacate other judgments based on their own local rules re-
garding reopening of judgments." 7 The Court held that the route to
denaturalization that Congress had created in the predecessor to the
current section 340(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act was
"the exclusive procedure for canceling citizenship on the score of
fraudulent or illegal procurement based on evidence outside the rec-
ord.""' This holding was based on the legislative history of the de-
naturalization procedure created by Congress, the distinctive quali-
ties of a naturalization judgment as opposed to other types of
judgments, and the danger of having a status of national significance
be subject to local rules of courts governing the finality of judg-
ments.
119
Justice Frankfurter found that the denaturalization provision at
issue in Bindczyck was "the culmination of half a century's agitation
directed at naturalization frauds, particularly in their bearing upon
the suffrage"' 20 and noted congressional concern that "elections
could be influenced by irregular denaturalizations as well as by
fraudulent naturalizations."'
121
Though the result of Bindczyck was abrogated when Congress
enacted the predecessor to Immigration and Nationality Act section
340(h), 22 which expressly permitted courts to use rules of procedure
to overturn their own judgments of naturalization, the Supreme Court
has emphatically stated that "[t]he underlying philosophy of
116. 342 U.S. 76 (1951).
117. See id.
118. Id. at 79.
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 82. The fallout from the Citizenship U.S.A. program provides a
perfect illustration of why denaturalization should not be left to the vagaries of
the political branches of government. As will be discussed below in Part V.B,
vesting the denaturalization power exclusively in the court system solves many
potential due process abuses that political considerations might introduce into
the process.
122. See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 340, 66
Stlt. 163 (1952).
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Bindczyck remains intact."'123 As Judge Kleinfeld correctly asserted,
"Ithat philosophy emphasizes the importance of citizenship and the
safeguards against taking it away."'124 In this case, the philosophy
mandates that no inherent power to denaturalize should be read into a
statute that does not explicitly grant such a power.
Kleinfeld found further support for this proposition in United
States v. Minker.125 The Minker Court demanded a narrow reading
of a statute defining the powers of immigration officers in denatu-
ralization proceedings. 126 This principle of statutory construction,
wrote Kleinfeld, "means that, if there is doubt whether the statute
confers the power on the Attorney General to denaturalize ... the
doubt must be resolved against the Attorney General."'1
27
In light of these Supreme Court precedents, the majority opinion
concludes that the power to denaturalize cannot be read into a statu-
tory provision that merely preserves the Attorney General's preex-
isting powers from implied repeal' 28 The court rejected the Attor-
ney General's argument that such a narrow reading would effectively
render section 340(h) meaningless by giving the saving clause noth-
ing to save.129 The court responded that the section was probably
meant to save other, more limited powers for the Attorney General,
such as the power to reopen a case in order to correct clerical errors
and spelling mistakes.
30
Judge Kleinfeld concluded the majority opinion with an expla-
nation of why citizenship is a right worthy of the highest level of
protection by Article I][ courts, and why courts should be wary of
administrative attempts to usurp the power to take it away:
Citizenship in the United States of America is among our
most valuable rights. For many of us, it is all that protects
our life, liberty, and property from arbitrary deprivation.
The world is full of miserable governments that protect
none of these rights. Many of us would be dead or never
123. United States v. Zueca, 351 U.S. 91, 95 n.8 (1956).
124. Gorbach I1, 219 F.3d at 1097.
125. 350 U.S. 179 (1956).
126. See id. at 186-90.
127. Gorbach 11, 219 F.3d at 1097.
128. See id. at 1098.
129. See id.
130. See id.
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conceived in wretched places in other countries, had we or
our ancestors not obtained American citizenship. The op-
portunities that we want to pass on to our children depend
on their secure rights to stay in this country and enjoy its
guarantees of life, liberty, and property, and the domestic
peace and prosperity that flow from these guarantees. An
executive department cannot simply decide, without ex-
press statutory authorization, to create an internal executive
procedure to deprive people of those rights without even
going to court.1
3 '
In other words, it is the duty of the courts, as the protector of in-
dividual rights, to narrowly construe statutes when a broad reading
would give an administrative agency the power to strip U.S. citizens
of their citizenship. "For the Attorney General to gain the terrible
power to take citizenship away without going to court," concluded
Kleinfeld, "she needs Congress to say so"132-- and to "say so" in no
uncertain terms.
V. ANALYSIS
The en banc decision in Gorbach v. Reno is a major step for-
ward for the federal courts in defending the equal treatment of natu-
ralized citizens and in curbing the potential abuse of authority that
might ensue from giving the executive branch authority to denatu-
ralize American citizens. Moreover, the decision reaches this result
without offending the deference that is due to federal agencies in
their interpretation of the laws they have been charged with enforc-
ing.
A. Why Chevron Deference Is Inappropriate
Both the majority and the concurring opinions recognize that
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council133 is the
starting point for any analysis of an agency's power to interpret the
laws that it is charged with enforcing. 134 In Chevron, the Supreme
131. Id. at 1098-99.
132. Id. at 1099.
133. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
134. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291,
1294 (2000) ("Because this case involves an [administrative] agency's con-
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Court, in reaction to the lower courts' practice of substituting their
own reading of statutes for agency interpretations, imposed a more
deferential standard of review for agency interpretations of law.
Chevron effectively mandates deference to an agency's reasonable
interpretation of a statute when the statute itself does not answer the
legal question.
135
The Attorney General purported to find her power to institute
administrative denaturalization proceedings in section 340(h) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, which provides that "[n]othing
contained in this section shall be regarded as limiting, denying, or re-
stricting the power of the Attorney General to correct, reopen, alter,
modify, or vacate an order naturalizing the person."'13 6 Standing
alone, this statutory provision does not clearly answer the legal
question of whether the Attorney General possesses the power to de-
naturalize outside of the federal court system. However, Chevron
does not ask courts to adhere blindly to the literal language of an
isolated subsection of the United States Code to determine whether
or not the statute speaks clearly on the issue. Chevron itself explic-
itly directs courts to use the overall structure of the statute, its legis-
lative history, and traditional tools of statutory construction to deter-
mine the clear meaning of the statute.' 37  Circuit court cases that
struction of a statute it administers, [our] analysis is governed by [Chevron].").
The majority opinion gives little weight to the Attorney General's argument
that the courts should defer to her interpretation of the statutes that give her
authority in the area of naturalization. Judge Kleinfeld simply notes that the
Attorney General "makes a cursory reference to [Chevron] for the proposition
that her action in promulgating the regulation at issue is 'entitled to consider-
able deference,' but does not develop the argument beyond that." Gorbach 11,
219 F.3d at 1093. Kleinfeld largely bypasses the Chevron issues lurking in the
case and bases his conclusions primarily on the idea that the power to denatu-
ralize--a procedure with catastrophic effects on the rights of individual citi-
zens-cannot be inferred from the power to naturalize, but must be granted ex-
plicitly by statute. See id. at 1091. The concurring opinion by Judge Sidney FL
Thomas focuses more closely on the Chevron issues underlying the case, par-
ticularly in light of the Supreme Court's recent gloss on Chevron in Brown &
Williamson. See id. at 1099.
135. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44.
136. Immigration and Nationality Act § 340(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1451(h) (1994).
137. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9, 845. Though legislative history is
often used to shed light on the meaning of statutes, both sides in the Gorbach
case agreed that there was no legislative history to show one way or the other
whether Congress intended section 340(h) to give the Attorney General the
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have followed Chevron have made ample use of these interpretive
tools. 138 When section 340(h) is viewed within the overall scheme of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, and seen in the light of con-
trolling Supreme Court precedent and traditional canons of construc-
tion, it becomes clear that, even under the deferential Chevron test,
the Attorney General does not possess the power to denaturalize U.S.
citizens.
1. Viewing section 340(h) in the context of the larger
statutory scheme
One of the most useful tools for determining the meaning of a
particular subsection of a statute is to look at it in the context of the
overall statutory scheme of which it is a part.139 The need to exam-
ine section 340(h) in the overall context of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act is particularly strong, as the provision is merely nega-
tive and does not affirmatively grant any kind of power. Judge
Kleinfeld construed this provision as a "saving clause" that merely
preserves whatever power the Attorney General might already pos-
sess.' 40  The provision was inserted, he argued, in order to make
clear that the other portions of the denaturalization statute should not
be interpreted as divesting the Attorney General of her preexisting
powers. 14  In order to determine what these preexisting powers
might be, we must look elsewhere in the Immigration and National-
ity Act.
The Gorbach decision mentions some of the "preexisting pow-
ers" of the Attorney General, including the power to grant naturali-
zation and the more limited power to cancel certificates of naturali-
zation without affecting the underlying status of the individual. 42 In
addition to these specific grants of power and limits on the power of
power to denaturalize U.S. citizens. See Gorbach v. Reno, 181 F.R.D. 642,
648 (W.D. Wash. 1998).
138. William Eskridge has compiled a diverse collection of the often con-
flicting traditional canons of statutory construction used by the Rehnquist
Court. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 323-33 (1994).
139. See Brown & Williamson, 120 S. Ct. at 1300-01 (stating that words
must be placed in context).
140. See Gorbach 11, 219 F.3d at 1094.
141. See id.
142. See id.
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the Attorney General in the area of naturalization, there is another
reason why Congress could not have meant to "preserve" the Attor-
ney General's purported power to denaturalize, and it is basic to the
very nature of her powers in the area of immigration and naturaliza-
tion.
The legislation that gives the Attorney General her power in
matters of immigration and naturalization states that "[t]he Attorney
General shall be charged with the administration and enforcement of
[the Immigration and Nationality Act] and all other laws relating to
the immigration and naturalization of aliens."'143 Clearly, under the
Chevron rule, the Attorney General must be given considerable def-
erence in her interpretation of the laws "relating to the immigration
and naturalization of aliens."'" However, even assuming, arguendo,
that Judge Kleinfeld is wrong and that the authority to denaturalize
can be inferred from the power to naturalize, the Attorney General
must overcome one more hurdle before Chewon deference is appro-
priate: can these newly naturalized citizens be considered "aliens"?
An "alien," as defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act, is
"any person not a citizen or national of the United States.' 45 How-
ever, Regulation 340.1 makes it clear that "the applicant shall be
considered to be a citizen of the United States until a decision to re-
open proceedings and deny naturalization becomes final."'146 If the
person haled into these proceedings is a "citizen," they are by defini-
tion not an "alien."' 147 Though Chewon deference would be appro-
priately applied to the Attorney General's interpretation of laws "re-
lating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens,"'4 it should
not be applied at all to her interpretation of laws affecting the status
of U.S. citizens.
143. Immigration and Nationality Act § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1994)
(emphasis added).
144. Id.
145. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)
(1994).
146. 8 C.F.R. § 340.1(g)(4) (2000).
147. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(3).
148. Immigration and Nationality Act § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (empha-
sis added).
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The regulations attempt to escape this problem by consistently
referring to the individual as an "applicant" for citizenship, thus con-
structively placing him or her in the position of an alien applying for
citizenship. 149 If the INS were to prevail in its administrative pro-
ceedings, it would be as though an alien's application for citizenship
had been denied, rather than a citizen having been stripped of his or
her citizenship. 50
The Attorney General cannot have it both ways. The categories
of "citizen" and "alien" are mutually exclusive, and the individuals
who receive the dreaded NOIR from the INS cannot be considered
both. If they are deemed aliens, then the Attorney General, simply
by sending the NOIR, has already summarily stripped a citizen of his
or her citizenship before hearings have even begun, which would al-
most certainly constitute a violation of due process. 151 If they are
deemed citizens, then they are, if not outside of the jurisdiction of the
INS altogether, at least outside of the appropriate subject matter over
which the Attorney General can justifiably claim Chevron deference.
2. The "clear statement" doctrine of statutory construction disallows
the Attorney General's reading of the statute
Another important principle often used to determine when Con-
gress has spoken on an issue is the "clear statement" doctrine. This
canon of statutory construction allows courts to construe statutes nar-
rowly when a broad reading would either render the statute uncon-
stitutional or force the court to rule on a serious constitutional is-
sue. 52 The clear statement doctrine, in effect, creates a presumption
149. See 8 C.F.R. § 340.1.
150. Indeed, the regulations provide that "[a] final decision to ... revoke
naturalization shall be effective as of the date of the original order purporting
to admit the applicant to citizenship. The order purporting to admit the appli-
cant to citizenship shall then have no legal effect." 8 C.F.R. § 340.1(g)(1).
151. See ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND PROCESS 219-22 (4th ed. 1997) (noting that the right to predeprivation
notice and hearing is generally required when an individual is threatened by
adverse government action, unless there is a demonstrated need for immediate
action to protect the public from serious harm, or there is a statutory or com-
mon law remedy available to compensate the individual for the loss of liberty
or property-neither of which is present in this case).
152. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
REGULATORY POLICY 321 (4th ed. 1999).
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that Congress will not generally create legislation that pushes the
constitutional envelope, and that if it intends to pass a law that raises
novel constitutional issues, it wiii use sufficiently clear language to
force the issue.153 Put another way, if a statute is worded in such a
way that it is capable of more than one plausible interpretation,
courts should generally avoid a reading that allows an administrative
agency to raise a serious constitutional question that Congress did
not clearly intend to raise.1
54
The language of the statute at issue in Gorbach is, taken at face
value, admittedly capable of at least two interpretations. This might,
at first blush, seem to lead inexorably to the conclusion that the At-
torney General's reading should receive Chevron deference. How-
ever, some cases decided after Chevron have suggested that the clear
statement doctrine can trump Chevron deference when an agency
interprets an ambiguous statute in such a way that a serious constitu-
tional question is raised. 155 Because the Attorney General's reading
153. See id.
154. This formulation of the clear statement doctrine makes explicit what
some commentators have suggested: that the clear statement doctrine is simply
"a more modest and targeted version of the nondelegation principle." Id. The
nondelegation principle is a doctrine--now fallen into disuse--that purported
to prevent Congress from delegating its lawmaking powers to an administra-
tive agency. See GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 151, at 12-18. The doctrine
was used explicitly by the Supreme Court on three occasions in the 1930s. In
each instance it was used to invalidate a statute that granted broad discretion to
agencies to make legislative-type policy decisions without in some way
cabining that discretion. See id.
The clear statement doctrine achieves the same objective as the non-
delegation doctrine: to ensure that Congress think with particularity about im-
portant policy issues rather than pass political hot potatoes to an agency to
avoid the political consequences of taldng a definitive public stand on a con-
troversial issue. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 131-34 (1980) (discussing the democratic im-
portance of requiring Congress, rather than unelected agencies, to make clearly
identifiable decisions on important public policy issues). However, the clear
statement doctrine achieves this goal in a more "modest and targeted" way by
focusing on instances where agencies make policy decisions that potentially
infringe upon the constitutional rights of individuals, rather than policy deci-
sions that broadly affect larger segments of the population that are better able
to exert political pressure in an attempt to change the policy. Such a targeted
approach is consistent with the modem role of federal courts as protectors of
the constitutional rights of politically unpopular minorities.
155. See, e.g., DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast, 485 U.S. 568, 574-75
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of the statute raises serious constitutional issues that are not properly
within her discretion to decide, this is an appropriate case in which to
give the clear statement doctrine precedence over Chevron defer-
ence.
The first major constitutional issue raised by the Attorney Gen-
eral's interpretation is whether or not naturalized citizens will be ac-
corded full due process rights in the denaturalization proceedings
contemplated by the INS. Under the regulation as originally prom-
ulgated, which put the burden of proof on the citizen to prove his or
her initial eligibility for naturalization, 156 it seemed clear that they
would not be accorded full due process rights. Perhaps recognizing
the potential due process problem, the Attorney General shifted the
burden of proof to the INS the week after oral arguments were heard
in Gorbach IL. 57
(1988) (holding that, although an administrative agency's interpretations are
normally entitled to Chevron deference, "where an otherwise acceptable con-
struction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court
will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is
plainly contrary to the intent of Congress"); BREYER ET AL., supra note 152, at
322-24. Compare Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), in which Justice
O'Connor, in dissent, argued that it was appropriate for the clear statement rule
to override Chevron when an agency decides a constitutional question that
should more appropriately be decided by the Congress:
In these cases, we need only tell the Secretary that his regulations are
not a reasonable interpretation of the statute; we need not tell Con-
gress that it cannot pass such legislation. If we rule solely on statutory
grounds, Congress retains the power to force the constitutional ques-
tion by legislating more explicitly. It may instead choose to do noth-
ing. That decision should be left to Congress; we should not tell Con-
gress what it cannot do before it has chosen to do it. It is enough in
this litigation to conclude that neither the language nor the history of
[the statute] compels the Secretary's interpretation, and that the inter-
pretation raises serious First Amendment concerns. On this basis
alone, I would ... invalidate the challenged regulations.
Id. at 224-25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
156. See 8 C.F.R. § 340.1(b)(6).
157. See Revoking Grants of Naturalization, 65 Fed. Reg. 17,127, 17,128
(Mar. 31, 2000) (amending 8 C.F.R. § 340.1(b)(6) by requiring the INS to
prove "by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence that the grounds for re-
opening and revoking [citizenship] ... have been met"). The INS asserted that
the reason for the change was to make the burden of proof in the regulations
reflect the actual practice of the INS in administrative denaturalization pro-
ceedings. See id. at 17,127. The INS further stated that if it discovered any
cases where the burden of proof set forth in the original regulations had actu-
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Though the shift in the burden of proof brings administrative
denaturalization proceedings more in line with the proceedings con-
ducted in the federal courts,' 58 there are other aspects of the pro-
ceedings that have troubling due process implications. For example,
the administrative official who issues the NOIR is the same official
who ultimately decides whether or not the individual was initially
eligible for citizenship.' 59 Though this does not in itself constitute a
per se violation of due process, it runs counter to the modem trend of
separating prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions in administrative
agencies160 This aspect of the regulations should therefore be
viewed with suspicion by a court charged with evaluating the risk of
diminished due process rights in an administrative setting.
The Attorney General's reading of the statute also raises poten-
tial problems under the equal protection requirement that has been
read into the Fifth Amendment by the Supreme Court.161 Courts
have generally applied heightened scrutiny to classifications that
distribute fundamental rights in an unequal manner. Though a de-
finitive list of exactly what qualifies as a fundamental right has never
been compiled by the Court, the right to vote and the right to conduct
interstate travel-both of which are at least tangentially related to
citizenship-have been consistently treated as fundamental rights.'
62
Courts have also applied heightened scrutiny when a suspect class is
ally been applied, it would "on its own motion, reconsider the decision under
the clear, unequivocal, and convincing standard of prooV' Id.
158. See supra note 50.
159. The INS District Director with jurisdiction over the naturalized citizen's
current residence is responsible for both preparing the NOIR, see 8 C.F.R.
§ 340.1(b)(2)(i), and for rendering a final decision in the case. See id.
§ 340.1(d)(1); see also Levy, supra note 12, at 1708-09 (comparing the weak
procedural protections guaranteed in administrative denaturalization proceed-
ings, in which citizenship is at stake, with the stronger protections given in
proceedings to cancel certificates of citizenship, in which the underlying status
is not at stake).
160. See BREYERET AL., supra note 152, at 33-35.
161. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (disallowing classifi-
cations by the federal government that would violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if made by a state government).
162. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (declaring a state statute
unconstitutional because it infringed upon the fundamental rights to vote and to
travel); ef Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) (holding that the "right to
traver' is part of "the 'liberty' of which a citizen cannot be deprived without
due process of law").
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burdened by a classification.'63 Though naturalized citizens have
never been declared a suspect class, and citizenship has never been
directly called a fundamental right, both branches of equal protection
analysis raise enough of a constitutional issue to mandate a narrow
reading of the authority granted to the Attorney General.
Though naturalized citizens, as such, have never been called a
suspect class, the Court has called nationality-a closely related clas-
sification-a suspect class.' 64 The Court has also stated, at times,
that naturalized citizens are not second-class citizens. For example,
in Schneider v. Rusk,165 Justice Douglas declared that:
We start from the premise that the rights of citizenship of
the native born and of the naturalized person are of the
same dignity and are coextensive. The only difference
drawn by the Constitution is that only the "natural born"
citizen is eligible to be President.
... [T]he rights of the naturalized citizen derive from sat-
isfying, free of fraud, the requirements set by Congress ....
[Apart from the inability to become President, the natural-
ized citizen] "becomes a member of the society, possessing
all the rights of a native citizen, and standing, in the view of
the constitution, on the footing of a native. The constitution
does not authorize Congress to enlarge or abridge those
rights. The simple power of the national Legislature, is to
prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and the exercise
of this power exhausts it, so far as respects the individ-
ual." 1
66
One might object that citizens who obtained their citizenship by
fraud do not fall within the ambit of this language. However, the
right to an adequate process before one is stripped of membership in
a favored class-citizenship--means that guilt cannot be assumed
ahead of time so as to make adherence to strict procedural standards
unnecessary. To say that these citizens should be subject to denatu-
ralization by the INS rather than the courts is roughly analogous to
saying that a defendant in a criminal case should have his or her guilt
163. See Boiling, 347 U.S. at 499.
164. See supra note 25.
165. 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
166. Id. at 165-66 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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determined by an administrative tribunal rather than a jury of his or
her peers, simply by virtue of the prosecutor's unproven allegations
of criminal activity. In other words, the potential constitutional
problems arise by virtue of the fact that newly naturalized citizens
can have their citizenship stripped by an administrative agency,
while all other citizens are entitled to a full trial in federal court. 67
The fact that only citizens who have been citizens for less than
two years are subject to denaturalization163 does nothing to lessen the
equal protection problems raised by the Attorney General's reading
of the statute. States have been prohibited from distributing benefits
to their citizens based on length of citizenship, 169 and the federal
government, by analogy, should not be able to make the rights ac-
corded to citizens turn on the length of time they have been citi-
zens. 1
7 0
167. The citizens whose citizenship can be stripped by a full trial in federal
court include not only naturalized citizens, see infra Part Ill.A, but also native-
born citizens-under more limited circumstances. Though having never been
naturalized native-born citizens cannot be denaturalized; they can be deemed
to have "expatriated" if they have voluntarily performed an expatriating act--
that is, an act that evidences an intent to exercise their right to shed their U.S.
citizenship. See generally ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 111, at 119-50
(tracing the development of expatriation law in the United States). An intent to
relinquish U.S. citizenship can be evidenced by obtaining citizenship in a for-
eign state, see Immigration and Nationality Act § 349(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1481,
taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign state, see id. § 349(a)(2), serving in the
armed forces of a foreign state, see id. § 349(a)(3), accepting a post in a for-
eign government, see id. § 349(a)(4), formally renouncing U.S. citizenship un-
der certain conditions, see id. § 349(a)(5)-(6), or committing an act of treason
against the United States, see id. § 349(a)(7).
168. See 8 C.F.R § 340.1(b)(1) (stating that the NOIR "must be served no
later than 2 years after the effective date of the order admitting a person to citi-
zenship").
169. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (holding that it was unconstitu-
tional to deny a citizen welfare benefits based on a durational residency re-
quirement).
170. This analogy is admittedly not perfect, as limits on durational residency
requirements for public benefits are generally premised on the
fundamental right to interstate travel. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONsTrruTIoNAL LAW § 16-8, at 1455 (2d ed. 1988). However, the analogy is
still apt because the Court, while purporting to rest its holdings on the right to
interstate travel, has in practice focused more on the penalty inflicted on new-
comers than on the deterrence of interstate travel caused by durational resi-
dency requirements. See id. at 1456-57.
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All of these factors taken in combination may or may not
amount to an actual violation of due process or equal protection.
However, they do raise enough of a constitutional question that a
court should, under the clear statement doctrine, refuse to permit a
reading of the statute that raises these questions in the absence of a
clear statement from Congress that the questions ought to be raised.
It is unlikely that Congress would have made the first two years of
citizenship a sort of "trial period" without explicitly so stating. Be-
cause the Attorney General's reading of the statute effectively cre-
ates a sort of probationary period by withholding full due process
rights for two years, her reading of the statute should be rejected un-
der the clear statement doctrine.
It can also be argued under the clear statement doctrine that the
Attorney General's reading of the statute should be avoided because
it gives an administrative agency a judicial-type power traditionally
reserved to the courts. Though Congress has the authority to dele-
gate such power to agencies,' 71 courts are reluctant to infer such a
delegation in the absence of a clear statement from Congress.
72
A variation on this type of clear statement argument in the con-
text of denaturalization proceedings was used by the Supreme Court
in United States v. Minker.173 In Minker, the Court was asked to de-
cide the scope of the power of immigration officers to subpoena wit-
nesses in denaturalization proceedings. Specifically, the Court had
to decide whether possible subjects of denaturalization trials could be
subjected to subpoena and questioning in their own pretrial pro-
ceedings.
174
Though the issue before the Court was a relatively narrow one,
Justice Frankfurter addressed it in broad language applicable to the
construction of the statute in Gorbach. The Minker Court called the
subpoena power:
a power capable of oppressive use ... true, there can be no
penalty incurred for contempt before there is a judicial or-
der of enforcement. But the subpoena is in form an official
171. See, e.g., Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S.
833, 847 (1986).
172. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1958).
173. 350 U.S. 179 (1956).
174. See id. at 180-81.
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command, and even though improvidently issued it has
some coercive tendency, either because of ignorance of
their rights on the part of those whom it purports to com-
mand or their natural respect for what appears to be an offi-
cial command, or because of their reluctance to test the
subpoena's validity by litigation.'
75
Minker weakens the Attorney General's argument that access to
de novo judicial review following administrative denaturalization
makes the implied grant of power to the Attorney General valid.
Whereas the subpoenas at issue in Minker could not, if ignored, re-
sult in a contempt citation without judicial enforcement, the NOIR, if
ignored, will result in loss of citizenship without any judicial inter-
vention. New citizens might be unable, or unwilling, to pursue the
matter in court after exhausting their administrative remedies. For
many new citizens who are struggling to establish themselves in this
country, being forced to try the issue of their naturalization twice-
once in the INS bureaucracy and once in the court system--could
prove financially and emotionally ruinous, leading many who ob-
tained citizenship legitimately to throw up their hands in defeat. In-
deed, many persons raised in less litigious societies may cringe at the
very thought of challenging a government agency in court and might,
therefore, accept with resignation the final determination of the INS.
The Minker Court found the greater potential for due process
shortcomings inherent in administrative process to be a relevant con-
sideration in determining the scope of the authority given to immi-
gration officers by the statute:
These concerns, relevant to the construction of this am-
biguously worded power, are emphatically pertinent to in-
vestigations that constitute the first step in proceedings cal-
culated to bring about the denaturalization of citizens. This
may result in "loss of both property and life; or of all that
makes life worth living." In such a situation where there is
doubt it must be resolved in the citizen's favor. Especially
must we be sensitive to the citizen's rights where the pro-
ceeding is nonjudicial because of "[t]he difference in secu-
rity of judicial over administrative action ... " These
175. Id. at 187 (citation omitted).
929
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considerations of policy, which determined the Court's de-
cisions in requiring judicial as against administrative adju-
dication of the issue of citizenship in a deportation pro-
ceeding and those defining the heavy criterion of proof to
be exacted by the lower courts from the Government before
decreeing denaturalization, are important guides in reaching
decision here. They give coherence to law and are fairly to
be assumed as congressional presuppositions, unless by ap-
propriate explicitness the lawmakers make them inapplica-
ble.
176
Because the INS proceedings defined in Regulation 340.1 are even
more explicitly intended to be the first step in the eventual denatu-
ralization of a U.S. citizen, the Ninth Circuit was correct to be wary
of reading the statute in such a way as to imply such a grant of power
to an administrative agency in the absence of a clear statement from
Congress.
B. Why Neither Congress, the Supreme Court, nor the INS
Should Seek to Change the Naturalization/Denaturalization System
Left in the Wake of Gorbach v. Reno
The ideal solution to the problem of delegating authority to
naturalize and denaturalize is to leave with the INS the former
power, and give district courts exclusive jurisdiction over the latter.
As Judge Kleinfeld observed, it makes just as much sense, if not
more, to impute to Congress the intent to vest the naturalization
power in an administrative agency and the denaturalization power in
the district courts. 17 7 Kleinfeld cited several structural reasons why
such a system is preferable. Agencies, he wrote, excel at processing
large volumes of cases that "do not take away important liberties
from individuals," but worries that they are "dubious instruments for
performing relatively rare acts catastrophic to the interests of the in-
dividuals on whom they are performed."' 178 It, therefore, makes
sense for Congress to give the naturalization power to the INS be-
cause the agency can process cases far more quickly than the courts,
176. Id. at 187-88 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
177. See Gorbachv. Reno, 219 F.3d 1087, 1096 (9th Cir. 2000) (Gorbach II)
(en bane).
178. Id. at 1095.
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and the denaturalization power to the courts because individual rights
are at stake. 17 9 When naturalization is performed by an agency and
denaturalization by the courts, the system can reap the benefits of the
peculiar strengths of both types of governmental bodies.
Moreover, separating these two functions makes sense from a
separation of powers standpoint. The INS, as an agency, is uniquely
susceptible to political pressure, in that it is directly overseen by the
Attorney General and is closely tied to the executive branch of the
government.' 80 It was this connection to the executive branch that
led many media pundits' 8 ' and Republican members of Congress
182
to suspect that the Citizenship U.S.A. program was little more than a
Clinton administration ploy to add more Democratic voters to the
electorate. 83 Indeed, there was some evidence that the drive to natu-
ralize over one million new citizens in the course of a year was ac-
celerated prior to the 1996 November election, possibly at the behest
of White House personnel.' 84 In addition to accusations of slipshod
criminal background checks, simplified citizenship tests were criti-
cized on the ground that they cheapened the value of U.S.
citizenship. 185 It is entirely possible that fraudulent naturalizations,
179. See id. at 1095-96.
180. The INS is a unit of the Department of Justice, which is under the di-
rection of the Attorney General. See ALErNKOFF ET AL., supra note 111, at
247-60 (describing the various agencies within the Department of Justice
charged with enforcing U.S. immigration laws).
181. See, e.g., Jack Anderson & Jan Moller, Clinton Ploy Strikes Again,
PRESS J. (Vero Beach, Fla.), June 22, 1999, at As; Michael Barone, Dishonest,
Matters, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 8, 1999, at 27.
182. See Congress Grills INS on Citizenship USA Program, 74 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 364 (1997).
183. Though a recent report from the Justice Department's Office of the In-
spector General admits that the Citizenship U.S.A. program vas flawed, the
report did not find the program to have been implemented for improper politi-
cal ends. See IG Report Finds iNS's "Citizenship USA" Program Was
Flawed, But Not For Political Reasons, 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1198
(2000). However, many Republicans in Congress who called for the investi-
gation did not accept the conclusions of the study, noting the refusal of some
White House advisors to be interviewed during the investigation, and Vice
President Al Gore's insistence on giving only written replies to questions
posed by the investigators. See id. at 1200.
184. See Congress Grills INS, supra note 182.
185. See, e.g., John J. Miller & William James Muldoon, Citizenship for
Granted: How the INS Devalues Naturalization Testing, at http://,%lw .ceousa.
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resulting from the inevitable errors arising from the rush to naturalize
so many in such a short time, may have influenced the outcomes of
certain close political races. It is also possible that simpler citizen-
ship tests may have resulted in the admittance to citizenship of some
immigrants with an inferior knowledge of U.S. civics.1
86
While expedited approvals and relaxed standards immediately
preceding an election may cast a shadow on the integrity of the natu-
ralization process and even affect election results, it is still appropri-
ate to entrust naturalization to the executive branch. After all, natu-
ralization is an inherently political undertaking that should be vested
in a body with a degree of political accountability. In a democratic
society, criteria for naturalization should reflect the values and pri-
orities that "We the People" feel to be important, and a politically
accountable body such as the INS is better qualified to judge who
should be made citizens than are unelected federal judges. The Con-
stitution even recognized the political nature of naturalization by
vesting in Congress-a branch of government designed to respond to
shifts in the body politic-the power to create a law of naturaliza-
tion. 187 Since Congress itself could never carry out the "high volume
business of naturalization,"' 88 the best type of governmental body to
perform the task is a nonindependent administrative agency such as
the INS.
Denaturalization is entirely another matter. Whatever regulatory
processes the executive branch may wish to use in granting citizen-
ship, it should not be allowed to decide when citizenship should be
taken away. If an incumbent administration can reap the political
benefits of increasing its voter base through politically motivated
naturalizations, it should also have to live with the political conse-
quences of having improperly naturalized those who were not quali-
fied.
The rights of new citizens should not depend on the latest politi-
cal winds; otherwise, it is as if no rights had vested on the initial
grant of citizenship, and such grants will therefore lose their mean-
ing. If citizenship means anything, it should at least mean that one is
org/htnl/citizen.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2000).
186. See id.
187. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
188. Gorbach11, 219 F.3dat 1095.
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no longer an alien at the mercy of the INS and subject to the plenary
power of Congress. The politically insulated federal courts are in a
far better position to treat new citizens as individuals with individual
rights, rather than as part of a group of people who merit lesser pro-
cedural protections because they collectively represent a political
embarrassment to the current administration--or a political opportu-
nity for the Congress. The federal courts have proven their willing-
ness to defend individual rights by treating even the undeserving
with this level of dignity." 9
Moreover, placing denaturalization proceedings in the INS will
inevitably result in naturalized citizens becoming de facto second-
class citizens. Those who have acquired U.S. citizenship by birth
cannot have their citizenship declared void by the INS. In fact, it
was in the context of a case involving a claim of U.S. citizenship that
the Supreme Court first enunciated the now seldom-used "constitu-
tional fact" doctrine, which states that administrative agencies cannot
conclusively determine matters of fact on which important constitu-
tional rights depend. 190 If there is any context in which this doctrine
might have valid application today, it would be in the context of de-
naturalization. If an alien becomes a U.S. citizen through chicanery
and fraud, Congress can validly declare that he or she can be stripped
189. Even former Nazi prison officials who lied about their past in order to
gain U.S. citizenship have enjoyed full-fledged trials in the federal court sys-
temwhen the government has sought to strip them of their citizenship. For ex-
ample, in Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024, 1031 (2d Cir. 1986), when a former
Nazi prison official objected that he would be subject to execution without due
process of law were he denaturalized and deported to a country where he had
been tried in absentia for war crimes, the court responded that "[t]he irony of
Karl Linnas objecting to execution without due process is not lost on this
court." Nevertheless, the court recognized that
The right to due process is, of course, essential to the American sys-
tem of ordered liberty, and must be extended to all persons in the
United States .... The considerable length of time that Linnas has
been able to remain in the United States after the discovery of his hei-
nous past is a small price to pay for a system of law which separates
our government from the government that Linnas served as Chief of
the Tartu concentration camp.
Id. Considering that even Linnas was entitled to full judicial proceedings in
federal court, it is doubtful that any of the plaintiffs in Gorbach are any less
deserving.
190. SeeNgFungHo v. White, 259 U.S. 276,284 (1922).
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of citizenship.' 91 However, if the INS could have discovered alleged
misrepresentations before citizenship was granted, this new citizen
should be subject only to the power of the courts if the government
wishes to proceed against him or her, and not to the INS. Constitu-
tional due process rights apply to the worst elements of our society,
and once an alien is naturalized, he or she is a full member of our so-
ciety, no matter how bad his or her moral character or conduct may
be.' 92 For this reason, naturalized citizens, if they are not to be con-
sidered second-class citizens, should only be subject to the power of
the district courts in matters of denaturalization.
VI. CONCLUSION
By preventing the INS from proceeding with its campaign of
administrative denaturalization, the Ninth Circuit has struck a major
blow for the equal protection of new citizens. The court made it
clear that the agency cannot escape the political fallout of the Citi-
zenship U.S.A. program at the expense of new citizens, who should
be accorded the same due process rights as any other citizens. The
Gorbach case illustrates what can happen when the fate of suppos-
edly equal members of the community is placed in the hands of an
agency, thereby leaving them subject to whatever constitutional hor-
rors the latest winds of politics may stir up. While modem immigra-
tion law has essentially rejected the idea of equal protection by al-
lowing aliens to be subjected to such treatment,1 93 there must be a
point at which immigrants are accepted as full members of the com-
munity. The point at which they become naturalized citizens-if that
designation is to hold any value or meaning-is a sensible point at
which to draw a line in the sand and grant them the full panoply of
constitutional rights accorded to any other citizen. Subjecting them
to summary denaturalization by the INS makes them de facto
191. See id.
192. Cf United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 197 (1956) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) ("The citizenship of a naturalized person has the same dignity and
status as the citizenship of those of us born here, save only for eligibility to the
Presidency. He is a member of a community included within the protection of
all the guarantees of the Constitution.").
193. See supra note 52.
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second-class citizens, and the Ninth Circuit has rightly prevented this
result by striking down Regulation 340.1.
Though it is unclear at this point how they plan to respond to
this ruling, there is some chance that the INS may seek review by the
Supreme Court, or that they may ask Congress to amend the statute
to give the Attorney General, in no uncertain terms, the power to de-
naturalize. Should the case arrive at the Supreme Court, the Justices
should reach the same result as the Ninth Circuit. Upholding the
Ninth Circuit's decision would harmonize this case with the spirit of
past Supreme Court decisions on denaturalization, which have
sought to protect the dignity of American citizenship and the equal
treatment of all citizens, while maintaining a reasonable sphere
within which the Attorney General would receive appropriate Chev-
ron deference.
Similarly, Congress should turn a deaf ear to any INS pleas to
amend the statute to give the Attorney General the power to denatu-
ralize. The current scheme of naturalization by INS and denaturali-
zation in federal courts provides safeguards that can only be achieved
by a separation of powers. It also combines the strengths of admin-
istrative action and judicial action into a system that protects the
rights of new U.S. citizens while maintaining efficiency and integrity
in the naturalization process. From a policy standpoint, Congress has
already struck the proper balance with such a scheme, and any at-
tempt by the INS to disturb this balance for its own political ends
should be viewed as an intrusion on the rights of new citizens-
rights that Congress has chosen to protect through an elaborate
statutory scheme for denaturalization in the federal courts. The
Ninth Circuit has properly decided that, in the absence of these
carefully defined statutory safeguards, naturalization is something
the INS can do that can't be undone.
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